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THE “EXCEPTIONALIST TRAP”: WHY THE FUTURE FIRST 
AMENDMENT MUST TAKE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTO ACCOUNT  
Amy Kristin Sanders* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Other countries do not have the same approach to freedom of expression 
as the United States. The American approach to freedom of expression 
wields influence around the world. Sanders argues the United States’ 
unwillingness to consider alternatives to the current categorical approach to 
free speech can no longer be justified. This Article explores the possibility 
of better aligning free expression jurisprudence in the United States with 
other liberal democracies. Sanders argues that alignment will result in the 
elevation of other human rights in the United States including privacy, 
dignity, and autonomy. 
  
 
*   Associate Professor of Journalism and Media, University of Texas at Austin, PIT-UN 
Social Justice Fellow. 












More than six years ago, I packed all my worldly belongings—
including nearly two dozen copier-paper boxes filled with casebooks, 
treatises and academic monographs—and moved 7,095 miles across the 
globe to the Middle East. Some might call it my academic mid-life crisis. 
Just a year after earning tenure, I had found myself with more questions 
about my academic future than answers. Little did I know that five years 
teaching and researching media law in Qatar would change my entire 
scholarly perspective. I had boarded the fourteen-hour flight to Doha as a 
First Amendment scholar, but somewhere amid the scorching temperatures 
and the sandstorms, I matured into a comparative free expression scholar. 
It took nearly five years to undo three decades of First Amendment 
indoctrination—an education in freedom of speech and press that began in 
middle school with my early interest in journalism. Like many Americans 
who graduate from journalism school or go to law school intent on studying 
free speech, I spent a majority of my scholarly life focused on what law 
professor Timothy Zick refers to as the “intraterritorial”1 First 
Amendment—contemplating the limits of free expression within the 
geographic boundaries of the United States—unaware of the global 
implications of American free speech jurisprudence. Even more, for a 
significant portion of that scholarly life, I had been steeped in the trappings 
of First Amendment exceptionalism—the misguided idea that our 
perspective on the five freedoms is vastly superior to other countries’ 
approaches simply because it protects more speech. As noted, First 
Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer wrote in 2005: 
[T]he American First Amendment, as authoritatively 
interpreted, remains a recalcitrant outlier to a growing 
international understanding of what the freedom of 
expression entails. In numerous dimensions, the American 
approach is exceptional . . . in ways that may also reflect an 
exceptional though not necessarily correct understanding 
 
1.   TIMOTHY ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING TRANSBORDER 
EXPRESSIVE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES 25 (2014). “The intraterritorial First Amendment governs the 
exercise of expressive and religious liberties within the territorial boundaries of the United States 
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of the relationship between freedom of expression and 
other goals, other interests, and other rights.2  
Schauer went on to explain how this exceptionalism distances us from other 
liberal democracies—a divergent path that has only widened since his 
chapter was first published in 2005.  
As American free expression doctrine has matured, the consequences 
of living in a globally connected world have become even more evident. 
First, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court invoked the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor to strike down two provisions of the Communications Decency 
Act as unconstitutional restrictions on internet speech in its 1997 Reno v. 
ACLU decision.3 Fourteen years later, Chief Justice John Roberts and seven 
colleagues ruled the First Amendment immunized the Westboro Baptist 
Church from liability for its hateful protests outside military funerals in 
Snyder v. Phelps.4 Our nation’s hands-off approach to internet regulation 
and its insistence that hate speech be tolerated have widened the rift between 
the United States and its peers. Only one term prior to Snyder, in United 
States v. Stevens,5 Chief Justice Roberts noted the Court’s decision in that 
case did not preclude the Court from expanding the categories of 
unprotected speech, but he did so with some reluctance: 
Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as 
establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new 
categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
 
2.   Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (emphasis in original). 
3.   521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional two provisions prohibiting the transmission 
of content harmful to minors via the internet).  
The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual 
basis of this contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet 
has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental 
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free 
exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of 
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit 
of censorship.  
Id. at 885. 
4.   562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding the First Amendment protected church members from tort 
liability for their hateful protests outside a funeral for a dead member of the military). 
5.   559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding a federal law criminalizing the creation, sale or possession 
of animal crush videos was overbroad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment).  
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Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of speech 
that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet 
been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case 
law. But if so, there is no evidence that “depictions of 
animal cruelty” is among them. We need not foreclose the 
future recognition of such additional categories to reject the 
Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a 
means of identifying them.6 
But the same Court refused to provide relief for Lance Corporal Matthew 
Snyder’s family, who had been confronted outside his funeral by members 
of the conservative Westboro Baptist Church holding signs that included 
myriad hateful slogans, including “God Hates Fags,” “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” “You’re Going to Hell,” “Thank God for 9/11,” and “Priests Rape 
Boys.”7 As this article will discuss, this act and others like it would not have 
been protected as free speech in many countries, including several well-
known liberal democracies.  
  
 
6.   Id. at 472. 
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This disconnect between the United States’ exceptional approach to free 
speech and other countries’ desires to protect citizens from hate speech or 
elevate individual privacy, dignity, and autonomy to equal standing has 
significant consequences for international relations. As Zick notes in an 
article published since his book: 
[O]ur First Amendment has another critically important 
dimension. Speech traverses and transcends international 
borders, citizens and non-citizens commingle across 
territorial boundaries for expressive and religious purposes, 
states and localities weigh in on matters of global concern, 
and the First Amendment is discussed, invoked, and 
defended in various global forums. Further, the fact that 
speech is increasingly subject to the laws of several nations 
at once raises challenging jurisdictional and conflict of laws 
questions. Foreign libel judgments . . . are also creating 
distinctive challenges for courts and other U.S. officials 
concerns about preserving the exceptional First 
Amendment protections.8  
These dimensions came into sharp focus during my time in the Middle East, 
where citizens do not enjoy the same speech liberties that I had been raised 
to revere. As a U.S. citizen living and working in Qatar, I was keenly aware 
of the limits that existed. Despite the guarantees of academic freedom 
associated with employment at an American university, I routinely engaged 
in self-censorship in both my personal and professional life. Was it 
necessary? I’ll never know the answer to that question, but I was certain that 
I did not want to become the expat making headlines in the local newspaper. 
“Qatar court finds parents guilty of defamation over online insults,”9 
“Slandering on social media: Expat gets QR10,000 fine,”10 and similar 
stories provided regular reminders that I was living outside the protections 
 
8.   Timothy Zick, First Amendment Cosmopolitanism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 705, 706 (2015). 
9.   Peter Kovessy, Qatar Court Finds Parents Guilty of Defamation Over Online Insults, 
DOHA NEWS (May 15, 2015), https://www.dohanews.co/qatar-court-finds-parents-guilty-of-
defamation-over-online-insults/ [https://perma.cc/6J85-VU5V]. 
10.   Slandering on Social Media: Expat Gets QR10,000 Fine, GULF TIMES (July 16, 2016, 
9:36 PM), https://m.gulf-times.com/story/502662/Slandering-on-social-media-Expat-gets-QR10-000-
fine [https://perma.cc/3M6T-TEYS]. 
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of the First Amendment. More importantly, those stories—involving 
Filipino and Indian expatriate workers, respectively—reinforced the real 
dangers of starting an international incident with a thoughtless quip.  
None of this is to say that the United States should revert back to its pre-
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan11 days of strict liability for defamation or 
criminal punishment for seditious libel. Rather it is to say, as Zick, Schauer, 
and others12 have said, that well-intentioned reflection on the state of the 
First Amendment in the United States is clearly warranted. As I will explore 
in the following pages, the possibility of better aligning our free expression 
jurisprudence with that of other liberal democracies offers much promise—
including the elevation of other human rights, including privacy, dignity, 
and autonomy, in American society.  
 
11.   376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public officials must prove actual malice to recover 
damages in a libel lawsuit). 
12.   See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security 
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449 (2014); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, 
Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: 
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I. AMERICAN FREE SPEECH EXCEPTIONALISM—THE 
PROBLEMATIC PREFERRED POSITION DOCTRINE  
 
In reality, First Amendment rights in the United States have never been 
static. They have evolved over time as the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the meaning of the forty-five words and the scope of the five freedoms. 
Despite the occasional dissent by Justice Hugo Black13 or Justice William 
Douglas,14 the Court has never read the words “Congress shall make no 
law”15 to be an absolute prohibition against the regulation of expression. For 
134 years after the Bill of Rights was ratified, states were not required to 
adhere to the First Amendment’s free speech mandate.16 It would take 
another six years for the Court to incorporate press freedom against the 
states.17 But in 2020, we take as settled law that state actors face limits when 
they seek to limit our expressive rights:18 
  
 
13.   Perhaps Black’s most famous articulation of his absolutist interpretation can be found in 
his dissent in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961):  
As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that doctrine for I 
believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no 
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who 
drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field . . . 
The Court, by stating unequivocally that there are no 'absolutes' under the First Amendment, 
necessarily takes the position that even speech that is admittedly protected by the First 
Amendment is subject to the 'balancing test' and that therefore no kind of speech is to be 
protected if the Government can assert an interest of sufficient weight to induce this Court to 
uphold its abridgment. In my judgment, such a sweeping denial of the existence of any 
inalienable right to speak undermines the very foundation upon which the First Amendment, 
the Bill of Rights, and, indeed, our entire structure of government rest. Id. at 67-68. 
14.   Justice Douglas, dissenting in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957), wrote: 
“The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude courts as well as 
legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence. The First Amendment puts free speech 
in the preferred position.”  
15.   U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
16.   See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding the First Amendment did not bar 
the state of New York from punishing political speech directly advocating the overthrow of government). 
17.   See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that a Minnesota law 
designed to prevent the publication of a newspaper amounted to First Amendment violation). 
18.   See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) (holding a private 
entity running a public access channel may prohibit speech based on its content because they are not 
state actors who fall within the prohibitions of the First Amendment). 
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The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment constrains 
governmental actors and protects private actors. To draw 
the line between governmental and private, this court 
applies what is known as the state-action doctrine. Under 
the doctrine . . . a private entity may be considered a state 
actor when it exercises a function ‘traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State.’19 
First articulated in The Civil Rights Cases,20 the state-action doctrine has 
since been applied, clarified, and interpreted with numerous decisions 
adding nuance and further defining its parameters.21  
In a similar manner, the law of libel—now clearly falling within the 
ambit of the First Amendment’s protection in certain instances—has 
developed throughout our nation’s history. The very act of jury 
nullification22 that took place in John Peter Zenger’s 1734 trial on charges 
of seditious libel set into motion a lengthy series of events across nearly 
 
19.   Id. at 1926 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). 
20.   109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit the federal 
government to prevent private actors from engaging in discrimination).  
It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of 
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and 
broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of 
every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, or which injures them in life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. at 11. 
21.   See, e.g., Edomson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
22.   The National Park Service shared this account of Zenger’s trial as part of an exhibition at 
Federal Hall, which stands on the site of the historic trial:  
The Attorney General opened the case, saying that the defendant had pleaded not 
guilty to printing and publishing a false, scandalous, and seditious libel against 
Governor Cosby. Chief Justice DeLancey then said to the jury, ‘The laws in my 
opinion are very clear; they cannot be admitted to justify a libel.’ When Andrew 
Hamilton spoke, he was made famous for arguing that ‘the truth is a defense 
against libel.’ When the jury withdrew to deliberate, DeLancey was drawn into 
an argument with Hamilton, perhaps reflecting that Hamilton’s argument had 
some merit. When the jury returned, the Clerk asked whether they agreed on the 
verdict and whether John Peter Zenger was guilty of printing and publishing 
libels. The jury’s foreman, Thomas Hunt, replied, ‘Yes. The verdict is ‘Not 
Guilty’.’  
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three centuries that have resulted in our ability to negligently print false 
statements about public officials and public figures without fear of 
liability.23 Along the way, the development of the actual malice standard—
which requires public official and public figure plaintiffs to prove reckless 
disregard for the truth24 to recover damages in a libel lawsuit—has 
influenced other countries’ libel jurisprudence.25  
Indeed, libel is not the only area in which U.S. free speech/free press 
exceptionalism has influenced countries around the world. Our statutory 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966 and rooted in the idea 
that citizens and the press need access to government information to hold 
their leaders accountable, helped lay the foundation for a global movement 
in favor of government transparency.26 Comparative media law scholars 
Kyu Ho Youm and Toby Mendel catalog not only the early influence of the 
American right-to-information law, but they also point out how FOIA—and 
ultimately the United States’—struggles to substantively keep up with its 
 
23.   See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public officials 
must prove actual malice to recover damages in a libel lawsuit); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment requires that public 
figures must prove actual malice to recover damages in a libel case, rather than “highly unreasonable 
conduct” as the majority suggested). 
24.   See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (where the Court ruled that actual malice 
required a showing that the defendant had entertained serious doubts about the veracity of the statements 
that had been published). 
25.   See, e.g., Edward Carter, Actual Malice in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 18 
COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 395 (2013) (noting that although the Inter-American Court of Human Rights did 
not use the term “Actual Malice,” the standard it adopted contained similar protections); Kyu Ho Youm, 
The “Actual Malice” of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: A Free Speech Touchstone in a Global 
Century, 19 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 185 (2014) (outlining the influence of the actual malice standard on 
courts around the world); Benjamin Herskovitz, Speaking Truth to Power: Criminal Defamation Before 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 899 (2018) (discussing 
the court’s ruling in Konate v. Burkina Faso). 
26.   Kyu Ho Youm & Toby Mendel, The Global Influence of the United States on Freedom of 
Information, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION 249 (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018).  
Today, dozens of constitutions recognize the right [to information] and, in 
addition, leading courts in many countries have read it into other constitutional 
guarantees, most commonly the right to freedom of expression.  
The United States is increasingly an outlier in this regard. The U.S. Constitution 
does not explicitly recognize a right to access information held by public 
authorities. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this right cannot be read into 
the First Amendment right to free speech of any other constitutional guarantee as 
a general matter.  
Id. at 253-54. 
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modern counterparts’ recognition of the fundamental right to access 
information.27 They note that other liberal democracies have since surpassed 
the United States, recognizing the right to information as either a 
constitutional or fundamental human right while the United States refuses 
to do so. 
Noting, in 1987, that 160 nations had used the United States 
Constitution as a model, Time magazine celebrated its bicentennial by 
dubbing it “a gift to all nations.”28 For better or worse, the American 
approach to freedom of expression garners attention and wields influence—
a quality that can either advance or impede meaningful conversation about 
global norms. As Columbia University President and noted free speech 
scholar Lee C. Bollinger points out, “[T]he Court must appreciate the power 
of the example that the First Amendment sets for the world.”29 Former 
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak confirms the value of looking 
outside his country’s borders to inform his legal decisions: “I have found 
comparative law to be of great assistance in realizing my role as a judge. 
The case law of the Courts of the United States, Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany have helped me significantly in finding the 
right path to follow.”30 
  
 
27.   Id. at 249-55.  
28.   John Greenwald, The World: A Gift to All Nations, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 92. 
29.   LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 117 (2010). 
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But some commentators have raised concern over the waning influence 
of the United States and its Constitution on the world stage.31 Despite being 
amended twenty-seven times—as recently as 1992—the more than 200-
year-old document appears not have aged well when compared with more 
recent constitutions. Constitutional law scholars David Law and Mila 
Versteeg wrote: 
Once global constitutionalism is understood as the product 
of a polycentric evolutionary process, it is not difficult to 
see why the U.S. Constitution is playing an increasingly 
peripheral role in that process. No evolutionary process 
favors a species that is frozen in time. At least some of the 
responsibility for the declining global appeal of American 
constitutionalism lies not with the Supreme Court, or with 
a broader penchant for exceptionalism, but rather with the 
static character of the Constitution itself. If the United 
States were to revise the Bill of Rights today – with the 
benefit of over two centuries of experience, and in a manner 
that addresses contemporary challenges while remaining 
faithful to the nation's best traditions – there is no guarantee 
that other countries would follow its lead. But the world 
would surely pay close attention.32 
Law and Versteeg discuss many factors, including American 
exceptionalism, that have likely contributed to the decline in the document’s 
impact.33 Chief among them is the post-WWII rise of international 
documents affirming fundamental human rights—an approach not taken in 
the U.S. Constitution. As a result, more recent constitutions seem to 
incorporate at least some of this human rights approach, even if no single 
document can be said to be highly influential.34 Even the late Supreme Court 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, known as a champion of equal rights, has been 
quoted as saying, “I would not look to the U.S. Constitution if I were 
drafting a constitution in the year 2012.”35 
 
31.   See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012).  
32.   Id. at 855. 
33.   Id. at 851. 
34.   Id. at 843, 850. 
35.   Model, Resource, or Outlier? What Effect Has the U.S. Constitution Had on the Recently 
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In many ways, this combination American exceptionalism and our 
nation’s reluctance to adopt a fundamental human rights approach to 
protecting fundamental freedoms lays the groundwork for my argument that 
future First Amendment jurisprudence must begin to take global norms into 
account. Each year, the Department of State and the United States Agency 
for International Development spend millions of dollars on programs 
focused on “upholding Western democratic principles such as separation of 
powers, the rule of law, independent media and civil society, freedom of 
expression and freedom of conscience.”36 I would argue that for the United 
States to regain its persuasive standing in the global community, it must 
adopt a fundamental human rights approach in its advocacy of democratic 
ideals—including freedom of expression. Doing so suggests the United 
States must yield some of its First Amendment exceptionalism in favor of a 
balancing approach that protects other goals, interests, and rights. As 
Schauer wrote: 
[T]he principles of freedom of expression impose 
entrenched second-order constraints not merely upon 
pernicious attempts to control communication, and not 
even merely upon well-intentioned but misguided attempts 
to control communication, but also, and most important, 
upon actually well-designed and genuinely efficacious 
attempts to control speech and the press in the service of 
important first-order policy preferences.37 
To escape this exceptionalist trap, Americans must turn our gaze outward 
to study the free expression protections of other liberal democracies who, 
 
Adopted Constitutions of Other Nations?, STATE NEWS SERV., May 29, 2013; US Supreme Court Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Egyptians: Look to the Constitutions of South Africa or Canada, Not to the US 
Constitution, MEMRI TV (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.memri.org/tv/us-supreme-court-justice-ruth-
bader-ginsburg-egyptians-look-constitutions-south-africa-or-canada [https://perma.cc/DM44-7ZHC]. 
For more about Justice Ginsberg’s seemingly controversial remark, which many argue was taken out of 
context, see Talk of the Nation, Should U.S. Constitution Be An International Model?, NPR (July 4, 
2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/07/04/156186033/should-u-s-constitution-be-an-international-model 
[https://perma.cc/RSK3-CYU3]. 
36.   DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FOREIGN OPERATIONS 
FISCAL YEAR 2020 APPENDIX 2, at 24 (2020), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1881/FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Appendix-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UM7-5BL2]. 
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“in their turn, have learned from American law.”38 
 
II.  FINDING VALUE IN A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE – PROTECTING PRIVACY, DIGNITY AND 
AUTONOMY  
 
After accepting my job in Qatar, I was lambasted by one American 
colleague in particular, who was appalled that I would be willing to teach in 
a country with such a dismal human rights record. “They don’t treat women 
as equals there,” I recall her saying. “They basically enslave poor workers 
from developing countries while paying them pennies.” In some regards, 
she was right. Only two years before I moved, advocacy group Human 
Rights Watch had reported that “[h]undreds of thousands of mostly South 
Asian migrant construction workers in Qatar risk serious abuse, sometimes 
amounting to forced labor.”39 But like many things in life, this is not merely 
a black and white issue. It is clothed in myriad shades of gray, as I would 
learn during my five years abroad. One need only look at the abuses that 
occur with the United States’ H-2 visa program, which allows temporary 
workers in the United States. As Vice reported in 2016: 
The report found that temporary workers both documented 
and undocumented were subjected to verbal abuse and 
curfews, and workers reporters having their wages stolen 
or being paid less than they were initially promised, as well 
as not being paid overtime. Employers also threatened 
undocumented workers that they would expose the 
workers’ immigration status to authorities.40 
And yet Americans continue to enjoy seafood dinners despite repeated 
media reports about the seafood industry’s exploitative work practices. In 
2015, Buzzfeed launched a massive investigation into the H-2 visa program, 
which it called “The New American Slavery.” Reporting on the program 
 
38.   BARAK, supra note 30, at 204. 
39.   Qatar: Migrant Construction Workers Face Abuse, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 12, 
2012, 3:45 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/12/qatar-migrant-construction-workers-face-
abuse [https://perma.cc/389J-M4PM]. 
40.   Wyatt Marshall, There’s Forced Labor in the US Seafood Industry, Too, VICE (June 10, 
2016 1:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/78md7b/theres-forced-labor-in-the-us-seafood-
industry-too [https://perma.cc/E25M-3P4M]. 
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designed to fill menial jobs with cheap, foreign labor, the journalists found: 
Thousands of these workers have been abused – deprived 
of their fair pay, imprisoned, starved, beaten, raped, and 
threatened with deportation if they dare complain. And the 
government says it can do little to help.41 
In reality, for low-wage foreign workers doing menial work, the job 
prospects are dim whether they find themselves in Qatar or the United 
States. Yet one country—relatively new in its independence and 
industrialization42—finds itself the target of numerous exposés43 leading up 
to the 2022 World Cup while the other—a member of the G7 who boasts 
the first written constitution and is more than 200 years removed from its 
industrial revolution—has routinely escaped scrutiny for the exact same 
labor practices.  
At first glance, it is easy to believe that the United States protects human 
rights while countries like Qatar do not. But the concept of human rights is 
multi-faceted, requiring observers to engage in a deeper analysis before 
drawing conclusions. It is hard to dispute that American free speech 
exceptionalism means more protection for speech—including defamation, 
sexually explicit speech and hate speech—in the United States than it would 
get in Qatar. But freedom of expression is only one of myriad fundamental 
human rights. The United Nations notes that “[h]uman rights include the 
 
41.   Jessica Garrison et al., The New American Slavery: Invited to the U.S., Foreign Workers 
Find a Nightmare, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 24, 2015, 10:47 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jessicagarrison/the-new-american-slavery-invited-to-the-us-
foreign-workers-f [https://perma.cc/YQF5-J34N]. 
42.   Previously a British protectorate since World War I, Qatar gained its independence in 
1971. Located on the Persian Gulf, the small island nation spent nearly two decades surrounded by war 
in nearby Iraq and Kuwait. In 1995, the ruling leader, Sheikh Khalifa was deposed in a bloodless coup. 
His son, Hamad, soon launched a series of modernizations that included launching Al Jazeera, holding 
municipal elections and ratifying the country’s first written constitution in 2005. See generally MEHRAN 
KAMRAVA, QATAR: SMALL STATE, BIG POLITICS (2015). 
43.   See, e.g., Pete Pattisson, Migrants Claim Recruiters Lured Them into Forced Labour at 
Top Qatar Hotel, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2018 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2018/oct/29/agents-duped-us-into-forced-labour-at-top-qatar-hotel-say-migrant-workers-
marsa-malaz-kempinski [https://perma.cc/JV8T-7UW7]; Vivek Chaudhary, “We’re Cheated, First in 
India, Then in Qatar”: How World Cup Workers Are Deceived, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2017, 8:02 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/19/qatar-world-cup-workers-india-nepal-cheated-
deceived [https://perma.cc/5HG5-HK63]; Barry Meier, Labor Scrutiny for FIFA as a World Cup Rises 
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right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of 
opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more.”44 
Other organizations and instruments would count the right to privacy, the 
right to autonomy, and/or the right to dignity among the list of fundamental 
human rights as well. 
From the outset in the United States, our belief that the First 
Amendment occupies a “preferred position” places some of these rights—
among them speech and press—higher than others—namely, privacy, 
dignity, and autonomy—in many instances. The Supreme Court has, in 
essence, created a hierarchy of rights. Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko v. 
Connecticut contains an explicit reference to the creation of this hierarchy: 
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken 
if there is a hasty catalogue of the cases on the one side and 
the other. Reflection and analysis will induce a different 
view. There emerges the perception of a rationalizing 
principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order 
and coherence. The right to trial by jury and the immunity 
from prosecution except as the result of an indictment may 
have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.45  
One year later, in a now-famous footnote, Justice Stone argued that the 
Court should more closely scrutinize legislation that targets some rights 
that, unlike economic rights, are fundamental: “There may be narrower 
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific 
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”46 Specifically, Justice 
Stone singles out several First Amendment rights, including “restraints upon 
the dissemination of information . . . interferences with political 
 
44.   Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-
rights/#:~:text=Human%20rights%20include%20the%20right,to%20these%20rights%2C%20without
%20discrimination [https://perma.cc/4LP9-VTCJ]. 
45.   302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that protection against double jeopardy was not a 
fundamental right). 
46.   United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 1, 152 n.4 (1938) (holding that Congress 
needs only a rational basis to regulate interstate commerce). 
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organizations . . . prohibition of peaceable assembly.”47 As G. Edward 
White goes on to explain, the concept took off from there: 
The term “preferred position case” refers simply to any 
case in which an opinion of the Court used language either 
openly declaring that First Amendment rights occupied a 
preferred position or stating that such rights should receive 
greater judicial solicitude because of the fundamental 
nature of speech rights or the “indispensable connection” 
between speech rights and democratic theory. . . . [T]he 
precise constitutional meaning of preferred position was 
never fully clarified in the decisions.48 
In particular, this elevation of expressive rights took off during the Warren 
Court, when Justices Black and Douglas’ broad views of the First 
Amendment echoed loudly. During these years, the Court constitutionalized 
libel law with landmark decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,49 
Garrison v. Louisiana,50 and Curtis Publishing v. Butts.51 
  
 
47.   Id.  
48.   G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech 
in Twentieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 328 n. 85 (1996). 
49.   376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
50.   379 U.S. 64 (1964) (holding the First Amendment require the same level of proof in 
criminal libel cases as it does in civil libel cases). 
51.   388 U.S. 130 (1967) (holding that the First Amendment requires that public figures must 
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Few countries, if any, prioritize freedom of expression at the expense 
of other fundamental human rights in the same manner that the United States 
does. The Islamic values that inform Qatar’s culture provide much stronger 
protection for the rights to privacy, dignity, and autonomy than the right to 
free expression.52 One example of this is criminal prohibitions on public 
photography. Article 331 of the Penal Code states:  
Whoever spreads news, photographs or comments related 
to a person’s private life, or that of his family, even if true 
shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding a 
year in prison and a fine not exceeding five thousand Qatari 
Riyals (5.000QR), or one of these two penalties.53  
Even more recently, a cybercrime law was added to the Penal Code, 
specifying the penalties for crimes that involve use of the internet.54 A 
further amendment made it illegal to take or share photos of accident scenes. 
As one Qatari attorney noted: 
The new provision will help protect people against the 
misuse of pictures and video clips and the subsequent 
spread of rumours and allegations. It is not a matter of 
personal freedom and the right to take pictures, but rather a 
matter of showing respect for victims and families who 
may not want to take personal matters to the social media.55  
Another lawyer stated, “We now hope that the new provision will help with 
respecting the privacy of others.”56 Qatar is not alone in its regulation of 
public photography; the United Arab Emirates also has restrictions on 
 
52.   Norah Abokhodair et al., Privacy and Twitter in Qatar: Traditional Values in the 
Digital World, Conference Paper at ACM WEB SCIENCE CONFERENCE (May 2016), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.01741.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKL8-BK9R]. 
53.   LAW NO. 11 OF PENAL CODE art. 331 (Al Meezan 2004) (Qatar), 
https://www.almeezan.qa/LawArticles.aspx?LawTreeSectionID=277&lawId=26&language=en 
[https://perma.cc/JQ79-A34P]. 
54.   CYBERCRIME PREVENTION Law No. 14, Commc’ns Reg. Authority (2014) (Qatar), 
https://cra.gov.qa/en/document/cybercrime-prevention-law-no-14-of-2014 [https://perma.cc/6BQE-
SZUY]. 
55.   Habib Toumi, Qatar Bans Taking Pictures at Accident Sites, GULF NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015, 
11:22 AM), https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/qatar-bans-taking-pictures-at-accident-sites-
1.1585446 [https://perma.cc/9WDC-QQ2L]. 
56.   Id. 
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public photography. 57 And many countries, even the United States, limit the 
ability to profit off another’s image or likeness without consent. Nearly 
every state recognizes either the tort of appropriation or a statutory right of 
publicity58—though many require the appropriation be for commercial 
purposes as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
The common form of invasion of privacy under the rule 
here stated is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff's 
name or likeness to advertise the defendant's business or 
product, or for some similar commercial purpose. Apart 
from statute, however, the rule stated is not limited to 
commercial appropriation. It applies also when the 
defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for 
his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a 
commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be 
obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some states 
have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of 
the name or likeness.59 
The issue of balancing privacy with freedom of expression also arises 
in the context of personal data. The European Union’s increased protection 
of personal information through the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) has made headlines and caused significant consternation in the 
United States, where freedom of expression carries the day. An article in 
The Atlantic details how the data protections were used against Romanian 
journalism start-up Rise, which had broken a story about a high-powered 
politician who was involved in a massive fraud: 
In its enforcement letter, the Romanian authorities said that 
Rise journalists had violated GDPR in publishing the 
videos, photos, and documents—in essence, the private 
data of Romanian citizens—to support the reporters’ 
allegations against Dragnea. The letter directed them to 
 
57.   Lindsay Carroll, Be Wary of UAE’s Photography Laws, Lawyers Say, NAT’L (Nov. 19, 
2014), https://www.thenational.ae/uae/be-wary-of-uae-s-photography-laws-lawyers-say-1.477146 
[https://perma.cc/4YWQ-VJKD]. 
58.   See generally Jennifer Rothman, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, LOYOLA 
LAW SCHOOL, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/ [https://perma.cc/KR9X-5YQX]. 
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turn over the identity of the tipster. It also ordered them to 
explain how they had obtained the information, how they 
stored it—this was the data-protection authority, after all—
and whether they had in their possession further private 
details on Dragnea and his associates. The big blow was the 
penalty: a fine of up to 20 million euros ($22 million), the 
maximum that can be applied against a small publisher in a 
GDPR case, if the reporters failed to fully comply.60 
In its defense, the European Commission issued a warning, telling Romania 
that its actions were tantamount to abusing the data protection regulation.61 
In the wake of Romania’s actions, the European Commission is 
investigating how Romania implemented the GDPR to ensure it is 
respecting Article 85, which says: Member States shall by law reconcile the 
right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the 
right to freedom of expression and information, including processing for 
journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic, or literary 
expression.62 Unlike the United States, freedom of expression does not 
enjoy a preferred position in the EU, as is evidenced by Article 85’s 
language and directive to Member States to strike the balance largely as they 
see fit. The European approach, it seems, ensures the balance gives adequate 
weight to privacy. 
Journalists and news organizations have also scorned Article 17—the 
GDPR’s erasure provision—saying it elevates privacy over freedom of 
expression.63 Under the provision, EU citizens have a limited right to 
request the removal of certain data—a right that has already been contested 
 
60.   Bernhard Warner, Online-Privacy Law Come with a Downside, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/europes-gdpr-elevated-privacy-over-press-
freedom/590845/ [https://perma.cc/9DCD-PBH9]. 
61.   Nikolaj Nielsen, EU Warns Romania Not to Abuse GDPR Against Press, EU OBSERVER 
(Nov. 12, 2018 5:19 PM), https://euobserver.com/justice/143356 https://euobserver.com/justice/143356 
[https://perma.cc/Q7KD-AXDN]. 
62.   Council Regulation 2016/79 of Apr. 27, 2016, On the Protection Of Natural Persons With 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1532348683434&uri=CELEX:02016R0679-20160504 
[https://perma.cc/6VQH-BQZS]. 
63.   See Michael J. Oghia, Information Not Found: The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ as an 
Emerging Threat to Media Freedom in the Digital Age, CTR. FOR INT’L MEDIA ASSISTANCE (Jan. 9, 
2018), https://www.cima.ned.org/publication/right-to-be-forgotten-threat-press-freedom-digital-age/ 
[https://perma.cc/W4CC-KPF3]. 
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in court, with the European Union Court of Justice recently ruling in Google 
v. CNIL that Google need not remove links on its non-European domains.64 
In practice, the right might allow a person who had been arrested but never 
charged to get a news report of the arrest removed. Arguments in favor of 
the practice cite the fundamental rights of life and liberty in explaining that 
the right to erasure allows people to move on with their lives and more easily 
reintegrate into society.65 To be sure, the right has been popular, with 
Google alone receiving more than 1 million requests to de-list more than 
3.8 million URLs since May 2014.66 The company’s data show it has 
honored forty-seven percent of requests to de-list, with one reason for 
choosing not to de-list being that the information is strongly in the public 
interest: 
Determining whether content is in the public interest is 
complex and may mean considering many diverse factors, 
including—but not limited to—whether the content relates 
to the requester’s professional life, a past crime, political 
office, position in public life, or whether the content is self-
authored content, consists of government documents, or is 
journalistic in nature.67 
Given American First Amendment jurisprudence, it is largely unsurprising 
that Google, an American company, uses a “public interest” justification to 
elevate freedom of expression over privacy, dignity and autonomy in some 
of its decisions. The concept of the public interest appears frequently in 
cases where U.S. courts have favored freedom of expression over privacy.68 
 
64.   Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission Nationale de l’informatique et des Libertés, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-
507/17 [https://perma.cc/6J9C-ZT9M]. 
65.   For a comprehensive look at how digital criminal and court records create lifelong stigma 
for those who are named in them, see SARAH ESTER LAGESON, DIGITAL PUNISHMENT: PRIVACY, 
STIGMA AND THE HARMS OF DATA-DRIVEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2020).  In 2017, researchers found that 
criminal record clearance provided both external and internal benefits, including lowering barriers to 
employment and affirming new identities as valued members of society. Ericka B. Adams, Elsa Y. Chen 
& Rosella Chapman, Erasing the mark of a criminal past: ex-offenders’ expectations and experiences 
with record clearance, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 23 (2017).  
66.   Requests to Delist Content Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY 
REPORT, https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/EX72-
SEDP]. 
67.   Id.  
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What is perhaps more surprising is that some American lawmakers—
particularly those in California—have begun to elevate privacy rights by 
passing state laws that have given residents rights similar to those found in 
the GDPR.69 California’s “online eraser” law was the first to take effect in 
2015, giving the state’s minors the right to request removal of content from 
any site where they are registered users.70 Although a few exceptions exist, 
the law is quite sweeping in granting minors a broad right to remove content. 
In many ways, this enhances the dignity and autonomy of young adults—
allowing them the opportunity to recover from foolish childhood missteps. 
More recently, the California Consumer Privacy Act, a data privacy law 
akin to the GDPR71, took effect in January 2020 to elevate the privacy rights 
of adults.72 and the California Privacy Rights Act passed in November 2020 
will expand those protections even further. 
  
 
Speech, 96 BU L. REV. 1 (2016). 
69.   Although an in-depth discussion of those laws is outside the scope of this article, a solid 
overview can be found in Grace Park, The Changing Wind of Data Privacy Law: A Comparative Study 
of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and the 2018 California Consumer 
Privacy Act, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1455 (2020).  
70.   SB 568, 2013–2014 Leg., (Cal. 2013), 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB568 
[https://perma.cc/D5F2-WF75]; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581 (2015). 
71.   Dimitri Sirota, California’s new data privacy law bring U.S. closer to GDPR, 
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/14/californias-new-data-privacy-law-
brings-u-s-closer-to-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/YLE8-MSPT].  
72.   Assemb. B. 375, 2017–2018 Leg., (Cal. 2017), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375 
[https://perma.cc/2TRK-7ZMT]; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-1798.199 (2018). 
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Further, some U.S. news organizations are voluntarily making decisions 
to unpublish certain content and changing policies about how they cover 
crime stories. In 2018, the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Cleveland.com 
announced a trial that would remove some content from their archives, 
citing the ubiquity of internet content in negatively affecting people’s 
lives:73  
In the old days, stories such as those appeared in print and 
were promptly forgotten. You could find them only by 
sifting through microfilm at your library. Today, through 
the Internet, the stories are at your fingertips, any time, 
anywhere. Because our platform at cleveland.com is so 
huge, our stories often are the first to appear in Google 
searches. Thus, our stories about mistakes made long ago 
become the first thing people see when they search on 
people's names, causing them no end of distress.74 
In addition, acknowledging that mug shots likely reinforce discriminatory 
stereotypes, the news organization has dramatically altered its practice. 
Instead of using them for all crime stories, the editors have decided they 
should only be used for “the most notorious of crimes.”75 In addition to 
removing the names of people who have had their records expunged, the 
reporters will no longer name people accused of minor crimes.76  
  
 
73.   Chris Quinn, Right To Be Forgotten: Cleveland.com Rolls Out Process To Remove Mug 
Shots, Names from Dated Stories About Minor Crimes, CLEVELAND.COM (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2018/07/right_to_be_forgotten_clevelan.html 
[https://perma.cc/2YZG-SRVY]. 
74.   Id. 
75.   Id. 
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The Plain Dealer editors realized their decisions might be unpopular 
with other American journalists and news organizations, who have long 
asserted that removing truthful content is akin to changing history.77 The 
decision clearly elevates interests in privacy, autonomy, and dignity. Editor 
Chris Quinn tackled the detractors head on: 
Many in our profession still feel this way. But anyone in 
our business with a conscience has been increasingly 
troubled by the situation. We have become the fulcrum for 
a lot of suffering. If stories did not remain on our sites, these 
people would not feel their pain. Who wants to cause that 
kind of pain?78 
Recognizing the First Amendment prevents the government from requiring 
United States news organizations to engage in the content removal process, 
Quinn focused on the ethics of the issue by emphasizing the need to do what 
is right: 
What we hoped was that we would launch conversation in 
our profession, with an aim at defining best practices. The 
First Amendment guarantees that the government can never 
regulate what we do, something I’d defend to my final 
breath, but journalists have defined our own best practices 
when it comes to ethics and issues of fairness.79 
Perhaps more importantly, Quinn’s editorial recognized the power of Big 
Tech—an issue I will discuss in the next section—in elevating these stories 
to positions of prominence years after they have been published: 
I hope the next step is for the search engines to join the 
discussions. Instead of having dozens or hundreds of 
newsrooms grapple with this individually, I think Google, 
Yahoo and Bing could bring a lot to the table. And I think 
they have a duty to do so. Let’s face it: the search engines 
 
77.   Chris Quinn, Journalists Are Key to a Right to be Forgotten in the United States, and 
Cleveland.com is Helping Spur the Conversation, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/10/journalists-are-key-to-a-right-to-be-forgotten-in-the-united-
states-and-clevelandcom-is-helping-spur-the-conversation.html [https://perma.cc/25FL-3JH8]. 
78.   Id. 
79.   Id.  
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are where these stories cause the harm. If the search engines 
did not turn up our dated stories about people making 
mistakes, the people would not be haunted by those 
mistakes.80 
News organizations, and by extension the Supreme Court, have long 
championed editorial discretion and journalistic decision-making—the very 
sense of ethics and fairness that Quinn wrote about—to advance their free 
expression (and free press) interests. But the rise of Big Tech has created 
dramatic changes in the free expression landscape—changes the Court has 
yet to fully grapple with in its jurisprudence. Taken as a whole, these actions 
by state lawmakers and news organizations suggest we should at least re-
examine our elevation of free expression rights above other fundamental 
human rights.  
 
III.  THE RISE OF PRIVATE PLATFORM POWER 
 
As Americans’ use of technology and the internet has largely become 
ubiquitous, our law and policy have struggled to keep pace with the new 
ways that these tools and platforms can be used to negatively affect a 
person’s life. Whether it is groups dedicated to hateful speech, made-up 
accounts used to quickly spread disinformation, or surveillance 
technologies used to track people without their knowledge, the internet has 
changed how we communicate in numerous ways that may suggest we need 
to re-think how it is regulated. Unlike previous mass media, the internet has 
allowed the average person the ability to spread information quickly and 
cheaply. Its search powers have all but eliminated the ability for information 
to be practically obscure, or hidden, in records that were once hard to access. 
Its networking capabilities have fueled shared cultures of hate and shaming. 
Its business structure has aided in the further consolidation of power (and 
valuable user data) in the hands of a small number of for-profit companies.81 
All of these characteristics, taken in conjunction with our history of 
differential regulation of media, suggest it is time to re-visit the hands-off 
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regulatory approach outlined by the Court in Reno.82  
Rather than treating the internet like print, which the government has 
been loath to regulate, some scholars and regulators have asserted it is more 
appropriate to treat the internet like a broadcaster or common carrier. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court refused to require a newspaper83 to carry 
certain content, it has held the opposite in the realm of broadcasting.84 
Further, the Court has even permitted content restrictions in the broadcast 
sphere, ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation that the First Amendment 
does not prevent the government from limiting broadcasters from airing 
indecent language during certain times of day: 
The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two 
have relevance to the present case. First, the broadcast 
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in 
the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent 
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, 
not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, 
where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.85 
Substitute “internet” for “broadcast media” and “hateful” for “indecent,” 
and we’ve largely arrived at justification for mandating content regulation 
on the internet in ways similar to those undertaken in the European Union 
and other parts of the world. 
Instead of heading down the Pacifica path that holds broadcasters liable 
for the content that airs and requiring the same of internet service providers 
and platforms,86 the Court has upheld Congress’ decision to immunize these 
tech companies through the enactment of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.87 Rather than taking the approach adopted 
 
82.   See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).   
83.   Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a 
Florida law that required newspapers to publish the response of any political candidates they criticized). 
84.   Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine, 
which required broadcasters to present balanced discussion of public issues to be constitutional under 
the First Amendment). 
85.   438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).  
86.   Id. 
87.   In relevant part, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) reads: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.” Id. 
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in Germany,88 France,89  and other European countries that holds these 
companies liable for the speech that occurs on their platforms, the United 
States has waived third-party liability for myriad offenses that occur, 
including defamation,90 failure to remove fake profiles,91 or incorrect stock 
information,92 and state tort claims related to threats.93 As a result, American 
law offers little incentive for platforms to step in to prevent offensive or 
harmful speech even once they’ve been put on notice about it.   
Although Congress has not yet stepped in to reform Section 230, 
lawmakers have certainly taken notice of its exceptionalism. In Summer 
2020, Senate and House leaders called a number of Silicon Valley tech 
leaders to testify.94 Further hearings were scheduled for late October.95 A 
full accounting of all the legislative proposals96 to reform Section 230 is 
outside the scope of this piece, but many experts agree that Section 230 will 
continue to garner serious attention from lawmakers.97 Although no 
 
88.   In 2017, Germany implemented its Network Enforcement Act, which obligated social 
media platforms to remove hate speech—in some instances as quickly as twenty-four hours after being 
given notice. Under the law, companies faced fines as high as €50 million. In 2020, officials went even 
further, obligating platforms to forward suspected criminal speech to the federal police as soon as its 
reported. See Natasha Lomas, Germany Tightens Online Hate Speech Rules to Make Platforms Send 
Reports Straight to the Feds, TECHCRUNCH (June 19, 2020, 9:02 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules-to-make-platforms-send-
reports-straight-to-the-feds/ [https://perma.cc/4QAB-ULV8]. 
89.   For example, French law forbids the sale of Nazi memorabilia, and a French court ordered 
Yahoo! to comply with the law by removing auctions of the merchandise or face fines. In January 2001, 
only months after a losing in a French court, the tech giant agreed to stop carrying Nazi artifacts and 
other hate-related items. Yahoo! to Stop Auctions of Nazi Memorabilia, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2001, 8:01 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2001/jan/03/internetnews [https://perma.cc/H5T5-
CQHJ]. 
90.   See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Batzel v. Smith, 333 
F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
91.   Herrick v. Grindr, 765 F. App’x. 586 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, S. Ct. 221 (2019).  
92.   Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000). 
93.   Delfino v. Agilent Techs., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790 (2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 98 (2007). 
94.   Ashely Gold, Lawmakers Plot Another Section 230 Hearing, AXIOS (July 21, 2020), 
https://www.axios.com/lawmakers-plot-another-section-230-hearing-5df71a6f-7320-446a-b151-
9c0929c5724f.html [https://perma.cc/5GAZ-5RNF]. 
95 Taylor Hatmaker, The Next Big Tech Hearing Is Scheduled for October 28, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 
2, 2020 6:46 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/02/tech-hearing-section-230-october-date-dorsey/ 
[https://perma.cc/3SGW-KQVJ]. 
96.   For more on various approaches, see Zoe Bedell & John Major, What’s Next for Section 
230? A Roundup of Proposals, LAWFARE BLOG (July 29, 2020, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-next-section-230-roundup-proposals [https://perma.cc/M9FZ-
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consensus seems to currently exist regarding the best way to police harmful 
or offensive speech on the internet, many experts agree the platforms exert 
serious power. As law professor Danielle Citron writes: 
[T]here is good reason to worry about tech companies’ 
influence over the ability of people to express themselves. 
The power online platforms have over digital expression 
should not proceed unchecked, as it does in crucial respects 
today. . . . In short, Section 230’s immunity has allowed 
platforms to monetize destructive online activity without 
have to bear the costs wrought by their operations. It has 
also removed any leverage that victims might have had to 
get harmful content taken down.98 
Still, legal experts express concerns about the impact removing 
platform immunity would have on free speech. Well-known internet law 
expert Jeff Kosseff was quoted as saying that the “major platforms came 
into existence because of 230. Without 230, their operations would have to 
be substantially changed.”99 In the same article, law professor Eric Goldman 
notes “[w]ithout [Section 230], a lot of things online we take for granted 
today will not work the way they currently work, and some things will no 
longer be available at all.”100 But Citron and co-author Benjamin Wittes 
believe the trade-off is anything but clear, “[i]t gives an irrational degree of 
free speech benefit to harassers and scofflaws but ignores important free 
speech costs to victims.”101 
  
 
moderation, American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.aei.org/economics/5-questions-
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KNIGHT FOUND. (June 16, 2020), https://knightfoundation.org/articles/digital-platforms-power-over-
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Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017).  











Unlike many free speech scholars, I do not purport to have the answers 
to questions about how to balance freedom of expression, privacy, dignity, 
and autonomy.102 In fact, arriving back to the United States shortly before 
2020’s summer of civil unrest only further confirmed that I had just begun 
to ask the right question: How do we balance free expression rights against 
other fundamental rights? As our country—once again—attempts to reckon 
with the systematic discrimination that exists against Black Americans, 
Indigenous Americans, and other people of color, we must be mindful of 
the role that hate speech and other troublesome content plays in devaluing 
groups labeled as “the other”—whether it be based on race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation. We must 
engage in discussions about the impact of Big Tech and social media 
platforms on our democratic marketplace of ideas, giving deep scrutiny to 
the power of the internet to share falsities and promote harmful speech more 
widely and quickly than ever before. 
Our historical fear of ad hoc balancing, or even case-by-case 
determinations, in free expression cases has held us back for too long. The 
categorical approach to regulating speech in the United States has proven 
challenging in several instances. Take for example Justice Potter Stewart’s 
now famous remarks about obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio: “I know it when 
I see it.” 103 Given the Court’s numerous unsuccessful attempts to outline a 
coherent test, I have to wonder if that statement is really true. The 
conversation about how to manage these competing—yet fundamental—
human rights, I suggest, must begin with a serious discussion of what former 
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak calls horizontal balancing: 
Horizontal balancing occurs between values and principles 
of equal standing. This balancing will happen, for example, 
when two constitutional human rights conflict with one 
another. Thus, the freedom of speech may conflict with the 
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rights of privacy, reputation, or movement. Horizontal 
balancing expresses the degree of reciprocal compromise 
that each of the fundamental principles must make, 
instructing judges to preserve the essence of the conflicting 
principles by crafting reciprocal compromises at the 
margins. This balancing attempts to ensure that the various 
compromises are proportionate and to give breathing space 
to each competing principle. One must avoid giving full 
expression to one fundamental principle at the expense of 
another.104  
Rather than continuing to default free expression to its preferred position, 
we must now recognize that the exercise of many of the associated 
freedoms, by their very nature, can negatively impact the same “discrete and 
insular minorities” that Justice Stone was trying to protect in Carolene 
Products.105  
Continuing to beat the drum of American free speech exceptionalism 
without engaging in meaningful conversations about the approaches taken 
by other liberal democracies—approaches that at least recognize privacy, 
dignity, and autonomy as equals to free expression—suggests we are simply 
tone deaf. The slippery slope argument—that it is impossible to regulate 
hate speech or other harmful speech because once we allow the government 
to start regulating speech, we will not be able to stop it—can no longer be 
used to justify our unwillingness to consider alternatives to our current 
categorical approach to protecting speech. In fact, as I have suggested, we 
have never fully embraced the idea that “Congress shall make no law” really 
mandates that we take an absolute position to our First Amendment 
freedoms. Fewer than 100 years ago, the First Amendment did not protect 
us from state infringement of our free expression rights and libel plaintiffs 
needed not prove fault to prevail. By today’s standards, that view of the First 
Amendment seems laughably outdated. Perhaps 100 years from now, 
Americans will look back similarly at the time when the First Amendment 
did not protect us from hate speech and platforms were allowed to determine 
their own rules regulating the content that was shared on them. 
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